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The Buddhist recluse in the late
Heian (794–1185) and early
Kamakura (1185–1333) periods as
seen through Kamo-no-Chômei’s
Hôjôki and the poems of Saigyô
Scott Lloyd
The need to hide away, removing oneself from the mundane for a set
time or a lifetime, is something which manifests itself in many ways.
Regardless of motivation – spiritual, psychological, philosophical –
such hiding carries some notion of personal renewal with it, whether
to regroup and re-enter the fray strengthened and better-prepared, or
to move towards an ultimate internal fulﬁllment. The idea of reclusion,
to avoid distractions on the road to spiritual reﬁnement and a more perfect wisdom, has been a part of human philosophy and religion since
Antiquity.1 In the Western tradition, the recluse often appears as one
either motivated by religious practice or so anti-social he can no longer
live within society. The East Asian recluse cannot, however, be understood exclusively as either of these two. To do so is to oversimplify
something which at its core is neither of necessity religious (though
one could argue it is always spiritual) nor anti-social.
Chinese attitudes toward reclusion predated its growth as a religious discipline in East Asia. In fact, entering reclusion was tradition1

Good examples are the Greek Stoics and Neoplatonists and the Jewish Essenes. (C.H.
Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism: Forms of the Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. [London: Longman Group, 1989], 2)
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ally a result of Confucian and Daoist thought, and was normally a secular, or political move. For example, a man might leave public life because it harmed his nature and could do so secure in the fact that a
rich philosophical tradition supported him in his decision, a tradition
rooted deep in the idea that a man’s primary responsibility was the
nurturing of his own self. The philosophical bases for reclusion gave
members of the imperial administration a justiﬁcation for leaving or
refusing public oﬃce and other members of society a reason for resisting pressures to take oﬃce in the ﬁrst place. As Buddhism moved
into China in the middle of the ﬁrst century c.e., it encountered this
already-established tradition of philosophical reclusion. Once Buddhism took root, the tradition of solitary reclusion could take on overtly religious overtones and become a ﬁxture of East Asian religious life
in general.2
Much as was the case in early China, the practice of removing oneself from the world was accepted and respected in Japan, religiously,
politically, and socially. Especially during the late-twelfth and earlythirteenth centuries, upheavals at the imperial court made a life of reclusion particularly attractive to members of the aristocracy. Nobles
could remove themselves from the most problematic elements of an
increasingly complicated public life by becoming aesthete-recluses,
which often included taking the tonsure as Buddhist monks.3 In doing
so, however, they still retained their upper-class cultural identities and
continued to practice traditional court arts such as poetry and music,
remaining very much a part of the intellectual life of the late Heian period.4 The eﬀects of reclusion and its ramiﬁcations, especially the impact it had on the development of Japanese literature, Buddhism, and
the greater culture, both popular and elite, cannot be overemphasized,
and many who chose the path of reclusion served as examples of the
2

3

4

Wing-Tsit Chan, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 425–8.
The term is applied to recluses who made artistic pursuits a component part of their
lives, as opposed to simply living lives of ascetic, religious seclusion. In fact, the disciplines of poetry and music in particular were often made a tool for achieving spiritual and religious goals.
Laura W. Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” Journal of Japanese Studies 21,
no. 1 (Winter 1995): 66–7; Tokue Mezaki, “Aesthete-Recluses During the Transition
from Ancient to Medieval Japan,” in Principles of Classical Japanese Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 154; Marian Ury, “Recluses and Eccentric
Monks: Tales from the Hosshinshû by Kamo no Chômei,” Monumenta Nipponica 27, no.
2 (1972): 149.
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proper life (especially in the spiritual sense of the word) for centuries
after their deaths.5 After all,though the point of reclusion is removal
from the world, there is no escaping the fact that phenomena such as
reclusion respond to and inﬂuence the social context from which they
spring. Those who remove themselves from society still aﬀect it directly and indirectly. If nothing else, holy people serve as examples to the
world they avoid, and what they value is generally valued by the faithful who cannot or will not follow the same path.6
Kamo-no-Chômei and Saigyô,two of Japan’s most well-known aesthete-recluses, are prime examples of this particular facet of Heian society, and open a window through their works not only into the life
of the recluse as an individual but also into the broader culture. The
following pages will attempt to shed light on the overall concept of
reclusion and its importance by looking speciﬁcally at what they had
to say about their own experiences: Saigyô through his collected poems, and Chômei through his seminal poetic essay Hôjôki “Ten-FootSquare Hut”, written in 1212. Why these two men? The most obvious
reason is that they were roughly contemporary with each other (Saigyô lived from 1118–90, Chômei from 1155–1215), and that both, at ﬁrst
glance at least, lived a similar life of reclusion guided by their Buddhist
faith. Both witnessed the period of transition between the end of Heian
Japan and the beginning of the Kamakura shogunate (the period which
traditionally denotes the end of ancient times and the beginning of the
Japanese Middle Ages) and were very aware of the drastic changes that
were taking place in society, which makes them valuable resources for
understanding the era.7 Neither attached himself permanently to the
communal world of the monastery, both choosing rather to pursue
their devotion (and, of course, their artistic interests) alone. They are
the prime examples of Heian aesthete-recluses,8 and are among the
most revered in Japanese history, serving as successful models for emulation.9
Beyond these details of their lives, their poems and reﬂective essays evince very similar concerns and themes, and manifest a similar
5
6
7
8
9

More about this below in relation to Chômei and Saigyô.
Ludo J.R. Milis, Angelic Monks and Earthly Men: Monasticism and its Meaning to Medieval
Society (Woodbridge, Suﬀolk: The Boydell Press, 1992), 68–72.
William R. LaFleur, Awesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of Saigyô (Somerville,
MA: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 25–7.
Ibid., 15–7.
Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” 66–7; Ury, “Hosshinshû,” 149.
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sensibility to the problems of life. The works of both men represent
some of the best of what late Heian literature has to oﬀer. Their inﬂuence on later Japanese poetry and prose is extensive, both directly as
a result of their own works and indirectly through the eﬀect they had
on Bashô in particular, one of Japan’s most important poets (perhaps
the most important before the modern period). Bashô especially admired Saigyô and sought to emulate him, noting in his work places that
Saigyô had visited or mentioned and even patterning his travels after
those of the earlier poet.10 His Narrow Road to the Interior11 was a tribute to Saigyô 500 years after his death.12 Additionally, Bashô’s Record
of the Hut of the Phantom Dwelling13 was modeled on Hôjôki, and Chômei’s works had a general inﬂuence on Bashô’s travel writing.14
In counterpoint to their similarities, there were also important differences between the men, diﬀerences that would aﬀect their religious
discipline and the tone of their works. Chômei15 was born into a Shintô
priestly family and was neither aristocratic in the true sense of the term
(he has been referred to as “an aristocrat of low rank without oﬃce”16 )
nor samurai. He took vows rather late in life at the age of forty-nine.17
Once he became a monk, he moved around little, shifting only once
from Ôhara to Hino, where he lived out the remainder of his life.18
When Chômei left society, he had nothing to hold him back: there were
no close family members or familial ties, he was unmarried, and he was
not a ﬁxture in court society.19 He himself says as much:
Therefore,
in my ﬁftieth spring
I retired from the world.
10

11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19

Haruo Shirane, Traces of Dreams: Landscape, Cultural Memory, and the Poetry of Bashô
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8, 11, 36, 268.
Written in 1689.
Ibid., 182–3.
Written in 1684, revised in 1690.
Ibid., 217, 326–7 (note 2).
I realize that I am reversing their chronological order here, but I believe the contrast
is sharper when Chômei is viewed ﬁrst.
Hilda Katô, “The Mumyôshô of Kamo no Chômei and Its Signiﬁcance in Japanese Literature,” Monumenta Nipponica 23, nos. 2/3 (1968): 340.
Ibid., 327.
Yasuhiku Moriguchi and David Jenkins, trans., Hojoki: Visions of a Torn World. Text by
Kamo no Chomei (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 1996), 23; Katô, “The Mumyôshô
of Kamo no Chômei and Its Signiﬁcance in Japanese Literature,” 341.
Ibid., 341.
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In any case, I had no wife or child,
no family to regret.
I had no rank,
no revenues,
so where the worldly ties?20
Saigyô, on the other hand, came from a warrior family and was himself an active samurai, a fact that caused him no end of anxiety later in
life.21 He became a monk at the age of twenty-three, much earlier in
life than Chômei.22 When he entered reclusion he left behind a large
number of relationships at court, not to mention a wife and at least
one child.23 Though he had loose attachments to established monasteries throughout his life, spending periods at hermitages attached to
these (most notably at Mt. Kôya and Ise), he was a wanderer who undertook at least three major journeys throughout Japan.24 The fact that
he never really established a single location in which to live out his solitude and to which he could return after travelling (in contrast to Chômei’s almost homey hut) adds to a sense of wandering in his poems,
and it has been proposed that this very wandering was a component
part of Saigyô’s ascetic practice, and that his denying himself a home
was a way of doing penance for past sins and served as a vehicle to the
goal of salvation.25 However, these diﬀerences, though they help give
each man his unique perspective and tone of voice, do not outweigh
the overarching similarities, both as recluses and as literary men.
Both Chômei and Saigyô are clearly genuine and earnest in their
religious pursuit – the concerns evident in their writings show this. As
one would expect from devout men, both are anxious over sin and its
eﬀects, present and future. The sin of attachment, in particular, is often on their minds. Chômei, in his collection of tales of exemplary recluses, the Hosshinshû (1212–16), speaks directly to this when he says:
In this way [through aestheticism] we constantly keep our
hearts clean of blemish and, before we realize it, we come
to understand how it is that things appear and vanish, and
20
21
22
23
24
25

Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 60.
LaFleur, Saigyô, xi, 1.
Ibid., 2; Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” 69.
Ibid., 75.
Ibid., 69–70; LaFleur, Saigyô, 15–7.
Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” 66, 80.
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we cease to have attachment to fame and proﬁt. This is to
enter the path of deliverance, of freedom from illusion.26
The problem with attachment is in the illusory nature of the world
and all it contains,and in the transient nature of those things men covet
and pursue. It is the base Buddhist problem of desire and yearning
which inhibits peace and serenity, and thus enlightenment.27 For Chômei, the greatest source of anxiety on this account are his hut and the
calm life he leads,28 for which he holds great fondness:
Buddha taught
we must not be
attached.
Yet the way I love this hut
is itself attachment.
To be attached
to the quiet and serene
must likewise be a burden.29
Saigyô’s attachment to the world manifests itself on a more human
level, for his attachments are much more personal. Though he wants
to leave behind the world in which he formerly lived, and work against
the bad karma stacked up by his family’s warrior background,he senses
in his attachment to this very world a threat to his vocation.30 His attachments are more emotional, and he speaks frequently of lost love.31
His references are frequently oblique, but he does let his emotion run
over on occasion, as in the following verse:
Hidden away
under leaves, a blossom
still left over
makes me yearn to chance upon
my secret love this way.32
26

27
28
29
30
31

32

Brittani D. A. Faulkes, “Politicized Aesthetics: Reclusion Literature in the Late
Heian and Early Kamakura Eras of pre-modern Japan” (master’s thesis, University
of British Columbia, 1994), 84.
Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 19, 27–8.
Chômei’s relationship with his hut will be discussed in greater detail later.
Ibid., 76.
LaFleur, Saigyô, 17, 19.
Saigyô, poems 777, 1349, 1390, 1587, 2042 (1200). References to Saigyô are by poem
number as listed in LaFleur, Saigyô.
Ibid., poem 653.
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He also alludes to carnal attachments more than once33 and makes
a direct connection between the carnal life and sin:
Black ﬁres had
their origin in dark nights
of raging passion;
stygian ﬂame is surely
like no other.34
Both men are also preoccupied with the attachments to the world
their literary practice causes them. After all, writing poetry or prose
is not only a potential distraction from their more strictly religious
practice; it in some sense forced contact with the greater world, as they
assume readers, and by extension, a desire for approval and recognition of obvious talent.35 Saigyô in particular struggles with this and
reaches some measure of reconciliation between poetic and ascetic
practice by seeing the discipline of poetry as a component of ascetic
practice. In other words, poetry can serve as a spiritual discipline as
well as an earthly one.36 The very holy (even saintly?) manner of Saigyô’s death stands as proof that said reconciliation must have been a
successful one for him.37
The concern over attachment is one facet of a concern over sin in
general. As one might expect, a preoccupation with sin naturally leads
to a desire to expiate sin. Both men speak of this, Saigyô wondering
in response to the bonging of a temple bell “will the sins of this whole
night/fall from me through its force?”,38 and Chômei painting a lovely
picture of redemption when he says:
Then in winter–
snow!
It settles
just like human sin
33
34
35
36
37

38

Ibid., poems 821 (979), 1441.
Ibid., poem 1851.
Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 19; LaFleur, Saigyô, 29.
Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” 91–3; LaFleur, Saigyô, 62–3.
Saigyô died in the second month of the year, under cherry trees in full blossom, a
time and circumstance he seems to predict in a poem he wrote years earlier. This
led contemporaries and later admirers to view his death as proof that his life as
an aesthete-recluse (as opposed to a simple religious, ascetic recluse) had not hampered his spiritual health. (Allen, “Images of the Poet Saigyô as Recluse,” 70.)
LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 774.

7

ozark historical review

and melts,
in atonement.39
Worry over sin and its atonement leads as a natural result to a quest
for enlightenment (or salvation, as it were) and a concern with the afterlife. Saigyô states bluntly:
When a man gives no
mind to what follows this life,
he’s worse oﬀ than
that tree trunk standing in a ﬁeld:
no branch or twig anywhere.40
There is a sense of anxiety, though, over how diﬃcult this is to actually achieve. Chômei says:
And so the question,
where should we live?
And how?
Where to ﬁnd
a place to rest a while?
And how bring even short-lived peace
to our hearts?41
The question of how to reconcile the earthly world of attachments
and sin in general with the search for enlightenment or salvation (in
short, peace) is never fully answered by either man. It is telling that
both express doubt about their vocation. Saigyô comments on the
seeming impossibility of a true, ﬁnal break with the world when he
says:
Why do I, who broke
so completely with this world,
ﬁnd in my body
still the pulsing of a heart
once dyed in blossoms’ hues?42
39
40
41
42

Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 64, 19.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 989.
Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 58; see also 55.
LaFleur, Saigyô, 87.
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And Chômei, at the very end of his work, says:
This is what I ask myself–
You left the world
to live in the woods,
to quiet your mind
and live the Holy Way.
But though you appear
to be a monk
your heart is soaked in sin…
Is your lowly life
– surely a consequence of past deeds –
troubling you now?43
It is fascinating to see this man question the value of the life he
leads, and the very eﬃcacy thereof, doubting even whether his lowly,
holy existence, which is intended to bring him more quickly to enlightenment, might not itself be the result of past sins.
Two overarching themes permeate both the poems of Saigyô and
Chômei’s Hôjôki: loneliness and impermanence. Both serve not only
as a commentary on the men’s worldviews, but also as a window into
their minds, providing a greater understanding of their reclusive life.
Though both chose to leave the world of men, entering a vocation
in which the goal is the severing of all ties and attachments to their former lives, their writings are full of a palpable, emotive loneliness, indicating again that both retained a level of attachment (after all, if there
were no attachment–no missing of companionship–there would be no
loneliness). Saigyô freely acknowledges his loneliness throughout his
poems, and speaks of his sadness and disheartedness at being alone.44
He treats this feeling explicitly and at length, saying:
Next to my own
it would be good to have
another’s shadow
cast here in the pool of moonlight
leaked into my hut of bamboo grass.45
Someone who has learned
43
44
45

Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 77.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poems 775, 1125.
Ibid., poem 409.
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how to manage life in loneliness:
would there were one more!
He could winter on this mountain
with his hut right next to mine.46
The one expected
doesn’t come, and the moaning wind
tells the night is late;
a sound outside deepens loneliness:
geese, calling, ﬂy past.47
Here in these mountains
I’d like one other who turned
his back to the world:
we’d go on about the useless way
we spent our days when in society.48
It is clear that Saigyô struggles with yearning for company, which
is no surprise in light of his previous life and his residual attachment
to it.
Chômei’s loneliness shows forth more as memory and recollection
than as a current, stated desire for companionship:
On quiet nights
I recall friends
while looking at the moon
through the window…
… I listen to
the distant cries of monkeys
and tears wet my sleeves…
… When I hear
the tuneful cries
of copper pheasants
they sound just like
my father and mother.49
46
47
48
49

LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 560 (627).
Ibid., poem 2042 (1200).
Ibid., poem 2170 (1657).
Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 67–8.

10

scott lloyd – the buddhist recluse

As an intrinsic part of memory is a consciousness of loss, it is clear
that Chômei was aware of that loss, and was made melancholy by it,
though at the same time he seems to be a bit more comfortable in his
own lonely skin than Saigyô:
Awakening at night and
poking embers from the ashes
this old man ﬁnds his company.50
Even though the following is from a passage in which Chômei comments on the sin of using another’s labor, it still reﬂects some of the
same sense of being comfortable in loneliness:
I have no companion here
and no attendant either.
Even if I built bigger
who would I receive here,
who would I have to live in it?
… why not ﬁnd your friends
in song and nature?
Why not be your own servant?51
It is logical that each man would voice his loneliness diﬀerently
when viewed in the light of their former lives. As has been noted above,
Chômei became a monk well into middle-age, and Kato has proposed
that his lack of close family and relationships made him “a lonely man
long before his retirement to the mountains.”52 When one is lonely
among people, the change to true solitude is less drastic, and even
brings a kind of peace. In contrast, Saigyô left his life in the full ﬂower
of manhood, and cut himself out of a very vibrant human setting. It is
understandable that he would have felt his solitude all the more keenly,
and his poems do occasionally have a wash of bitterness in loss that is
absent in Chômei.
Though friendly company is missed by both men, their writings
do evince the presence of alternate companions who serve to take the
edge oﬀ loneliness, at least in some degree. In Saigyô there is a strong
50
51
52

Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 72.
Katô, “The Mumyôshô of Kamo no Chômei and Its Signiﬁcance in Japanese Literature,” 341.
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sense of the moon as companion, and he reaches the point of personifying her and makes her a stand-in for other company, especially his
lost love:
Here I huddle, alone,
in a mountain’s shadow, needing
some companion somehow:
the cold, biting rains pass oﬀ
and give me the winter moon.53
This place of mine
never is entered by humans
come for conversation,
only by the mute moon’s light shafts
which slip in between the trees.54
I’ll never forget
her look when I said goodbye…
especially since,
as keepsake, she set her sorrowﬁlled face on the moon above.55
A melancholy, insuﬃcient companion perhaps, but one that nonetheless provides Saigyô with at least some solace.
Chômei is better-oﬀ on this count, as he enjoys the presence of a
young boy, the son of the local mountainkeeper:
There is a simple hut
of brushwood
at the foot of the hill
where the mountainkeeper lives.
And there is a little boy
who sometimes visits.
When all is still
I walk with this companion.
He is ten, I am sixty,
53
54
55

LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 610.
Ibid., poem 1031.
Ibid., poem 684 (1185).
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so the diﬀerence is great.
Yet both delight.56
The child seems a particularly ﬁt companion to the recluse,for even
though he is a fellow human, and certainly ﬁlls the need for human contact on a very real level, the contact is the most simple, pure pleasure in
companionship, unencumbered by adult concerns and problems, discussions and polemics; it is perhaps the ﬁnest example of a human relationship which is beneﬁcial to the soul’s journey rather than detrimental. It allows Chômei to fulﬁll the human need to share that in which
one delights with another who is equally delighted, and the joy Chômei feels wandering the mountains with this child is obvious.
It is also worth noting that both men ﬁnd some sense of melancholy companionship in the fauna that surrounds them, which seems
especially appropriate for Buddhists who see all life as similar and equally important. In particular, both mention deer,57 monkeys,58 and
various kinds of birds.59 Saigyô sums it up well when he says:
On a mountain stream,
a mandarin duck made single
by loss of its mate
now ﬂoats quietly over ripples:
a frame of mind I know.60
Here one sees a beautiful combination of aﬃnity with life on a setting of ﬂoating impermanence (water) that symbolically mirrors Saigyô’s own transient environment.
The sense of loneliness serves to heighten the theme of impermanence in both men’s work. After all, if life were concrete and not transient, those conditions of separation and loss which bring about loneliness would not exist. Impermanence as a theme is also quite ﬁtting
for a Buddhist recluse – or any religious recluse, for that matter – as it
is in keeping with ideas on the world as a passing home at best that are
present in Buddhism, as in all the world’s major religions.
56
57
58
59

60

Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 66.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poems 481, 482 (448); Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 68.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 793; Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 68.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poems 39 (warblers), 2063 (1193) (ducks); Moriguchi and Jenkins,
Hojoki, 64 (cuckoos), 68 (owls, pheasants).
LaFleur, Saigyô, poems 2063 (1193).

13

ozark historical review

Chômei cuts straight to the heart of this impermanence with his
wonderful opening lines to Hôjôki:
The ﬂowing river never stops and yet the water never stays
the same. Foam ﬂoats upon the pools, scattering, re-forming, never lingering long. So it is with man and all his dwelling places here on earth.61
He goes on to oﬀer a lengthy commentary (the ﬁrst third or so of
his work is devoted to it) on the general impermanence, futility and
passing nature of the works of men, especially their buildings, cities
and the possessions they spend their lives pursuing,62 and becomes especially pointed when he says: “ All of man’s doings are senseless but
spending his wealth and tormenting himself to build a house in this
hazardous city is especially foolish.”63 and talks about how “we and
our houses/[are] ﬂeeting, hollow.”64
Saigyô also deals with the world’s impermanence, speaking of “…
the world man spins:/a world quickly vanishing,”65 and commenting
on the fundamental irreality of the world, saying:
Since the “real world” seems
to be less than truly real,
why need I suppose
the world of dreams is nothing
other than a world of dreams.66
He, too, mentions the passing nature of his immediate surroundings:
Nowhere is there place
to stop and live, so only
everywhere will do:
each and every grass-made hut soon leaves
its place within this withering world.67
It is ironic that in Chômei’s case the very thing that he is most attached to in his recluded life, his hut, is one of those very things (houses
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 31.
Ibid., 32–54.
Ibid., 38.
Ibid., 54.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 1605.
Ibid., poem 1606.
Ibid., 2175 (1778).
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in general) that provide his literary device throughout the Hôjôki to
symbolize the very tension between attachment and impermanence.
The recurrent image of houses and buildings is what holds his essay together and allows him some of his most acid attacks. Yet it is one of
these selfsame houses that provides him comfort.68
Oddly enough, the two themes show opposed elements of the
men’s Buddhist perspective. Being lonely implies attachment – a lingering connection to and need for companionship. Impermanence
makes attachment futile. The interplay and tension between these two
themes gives an added depth and strength to the writings of both men,
and allows them to convey much more meaning than what they say explicitly through words.
For a recluse of any variety to be successful in his practice, he must
ﬁrst choose a ﬁt environment for his reclusion. Mountains, perhaps
more than any other natural setting, provide a landscape conducive to
the mindset. Whether for the philosophical recluse in ancient China,
or the religious recluse in Buddhist Japan and China or the Christian
West, mountains are an ever-present backdrop to life. The nature of
this backdrop takes two forms: physical and symbolic.
Physically, mountains support the recluse experience in two ways.
First, they serve to enhance and focus the recluse’s loneliness and separation by virtue of their very remoteness. Saigyô notes this:
Here I’ve a place
so remote, so mountain-closed,
none comes to call.69
By imagining
these mountain depths, some might think
they come and go here;
but, not living here themselves,
can they know true pathos?70
and Chômei mentions:
I hide myself away
deep in the hills of Hino.71
68
69
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Moriguchi and Jenkins, Hojoki, 17.
LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 793.
Ibid., poem 2161 (1630).
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Second, mountains assist in the ascetic side of the recluse’s life by
providing a setting that is, simply put, physically diﬃcult to move
about and survive in. More than once, Saigyô mentions the ruggedness
and danger inherent to his life in the mountains:
So steep and dangerous
is Mount Arachi that there’s
no path down the valley…72
Scaling the crags
where azalea bloom… not for plucking
but for hanging on!
the saving feature of this rugged
mountain face I’m climbing.73
He even forgets his love of ﬂowers in the face of the danger he is
passing through! But beyond the incidental asceticism that is provided
by a simply diﬃcult life, mountains provide a means of intentional ascetic practice,as seen in the virtue of climbing to a particularly diﬃcultto-reach temple:
The climb up to Mandala Temple in order to carry out the
activities proper for a pilgrim there was an unusually difﬁcult one. The climber must make what seems like an almost perpendicular ascent… It is said Kôbô Daishi74
climbed up on to this every day in order to perform austerities. In order for others to perform devotional activities
on it [without risk of falling oﬀ], a double enclosure has
been constructed. Nevertheless, the dangers one faces in
making a climb up to this place are truly extraordinary. I,
for one, made my way to the top by crawling along on all
fours.75
Additionally, the everyday climatological events humans live with
– rain, snow, wind – are compounded in mountains, and make life a
much more dangerous proposition than it is in more benign settings,
as Saigyô attests to:
72
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When the fallen snow
buried the twigs bent by me
to mark a return trail,
unplanned, in strange mountains,
I was holed up all winter.76
Regardless of whether he refers to a literal stranding (which seems
somehow unlikely) or simply uses the idea to show the unpredictability of mountain life, he gets his point across.
Symbolically, mountains become even more important. In Buddhist literary arts, scaling mountains (especially so as to visit monasteries or other holy sites) symbolizes the rise from illusion to Nirvana
and the diﬃcult path of attaining enlightenment. This symbolism is alluded to in the above quote regarding Saigyô’s climb to Mandala Temple. Beyond the Buddhist and poetical nature of mountains’ symbolism, though, was an older tradition in Japan, in which mountains
were seen as the abodes of sacred beings.77 There were important religious associations in the Shintô religion of gods with mountains, and
the passes that cut through them were seen as sacred places where people could come into contact with deities. Saigyô, though he is a Buddhist, refers to this when he speaks of
Following the paths
the gods passed over, I seek
their innermost place;
up and up to the highest of all:
peak where wind soughs through pines.78
In spite of all their dangers, though, a love for mountains and the
beauty contained therein is evident. Long before, Bai Juyi, a devout
man, but hardly a monk, had said that “the mountain belongs to the
person who loves the mountain”,79 speaking of the magniﬁcent beauty
mountain views provided and of the sense of peace and tranquility they
oﬀered. This sense of delight in mountainous beauty is echoed in Saigyô:
76
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What a wretched place
this would be if this despised,
quickly passing world
had no place to hide away –
that is, no mountains in it.80
and also in Chômei:
The mountains do not daunt me,
so I enjoy the hooting of the owl.
Each passing season
brings its own enchantment.81
When reading the verses of Saigyô (with their frequent, rapt references to cherry blossoms and other wonders) or the Hôjôki of Chômei (with its lovely passage in which the author recounts his delight
in wandering the mountains with his innocent, youthful companion),
one cannot help but come away with the impression that these two
men loved the setting in which they had chosen to exile themselves,
not just for the assistance it provided in their devotions but for its very
beauty. The physical separation and penance and loneliness of the lives
both men chose were tempered by a love of the beauty which surrounded them.
As much as the mountains in which they are set, huts play a central
role in the lives and reclusive practice of both men. Even though the
recluse sought mountains for their very ruggedness and the diﬃculty
of life in them, he nonetheless required some sort of shelter to make
life tenable. Taken at face value, the nature of the huts supports the ascetic life lived without luxuries. Saigyô drops references to huts which
are tenuous in construction (generally bamboo grass) and which offer small protection at best, especially against rain and moisture.82 He
sums it up neatly when he talks of this lonely, battered hut:
in the midst of mountain storm’s fury,
drops drip in holes and silences.83
Throughout Chômei’s Hôjôki, though, we see a much more subtle, lovely relationship between man and hut. Chômei chronicles a speciﬁc pattern of downsizing in his life, beginning with the house (presumably
80
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LaFleur, Saigyô, poem 991.
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LaFleur, Saigyô, poems 388, 409, 454, 456.
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still in the city) he built after his family situation became tumultuous,
a house which was “one-tenth the size/of my former house”,84 a humble construction much limited by funds, and not only hampered by
size, but also by location:
When it snowed
or the wind blew
my house felt precarious.
It was near the river
so danger from ﬂooding
always loomed.
The place was also
overrun with thieves.85
It is when he builds what will be his last dwelling, though, in Hino, that
one begins to see the special relationship which develops. The theme
of downsizing continues, but his tone begins to change:
Then
well into my sixth decade,
when the dew of life disappears,
I built a little hut,
a leaf from which
the last drops might fall.
I was a wayfarer
raising a rude shelter,
an old silk worm
spinning one last cocoon.
Unlike the house of my middle years,
this not even one hundredth the size.
The fact is
I get older,
my houses smaller.
As a house it is unique,
ten feet by ten,
the height no more than seven.86
84
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He goes on to detail the simplicity of his hut and its easily-moveable
construction,and the fact that it contains only that which is essential.87
It is by no means grand and exciting:
… nothing happens here
in my little hut.
Small as it is
there is room to sleep at night
and sit by day,
Space enough
for one man.88
Yet, before he has even ﬁnished telling the reader how basic his hut
is, he has already called it “home”,89 a word heavy with connotation.
He later elaborates on the theme:
When I moved here
I did not mean to stay this long,
but ﬁve years have passed.
This rough shelter
has become my home.90
He speaks of the happiness he feels upon returning to his hut after having been away,91 and goes so far as to eventually say “I love my lonely
dwelling, / this one-room hut”.92 Even the detailed nature of his description of his hut shows that he is proud of it, and happy with the
result.
Saigyô never seems to develop this same sort of close connection
with locale (and huts in speciﬁc), perhaps because he moves about a
great deal more than Chômei ever did. Saigyô implies that the huts
where he stays are not his own when he says “No other is anywhere /
near this borrowed ﬁeld shed”.93 And yet he, also, at some point or another succumbed to the human need for a sense of home, however impermanent, speaking of
87
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… my mountain hut
whose congenial loneliness
I’d hate to live without.94
Beyond meeting a simply physical need, huts are symbolic and
even problematic. Though the shelter they oﬀer can hardly be dispensed with, the connection they engender is a very real impediment
to the loosing of attachments. Chômei and Saigyô use this symbol effectively. The glimpses one gets from both men about their environment mirror many of the same issues one sees as overarching themes
in their works; the mountains and huts become additional motifs
through which to address the concerns which nag at them.
In his article “A Comparison of the Early Forms of Buddhist and
Christian Monastic Tradition”,95 Mathieu Boisvert argues that the
drive to renounce worldly life is a natural development amongst devoted followers of religions in general, with the common goal of “relief from the vicissitudes of day-to-day life, either through the attainment of nibbana or through union with God”.96 Diﬀerent traditions
are joined by a focus on discipline, a single-mindedness of goal, and a
sense of passage through a transitory world – a sense of being strangers,
as it were.97 This shows through clearly in the works of Chômei and
Saigyô.
Through Chômei’s Hôjôki and Saigyô’s poems, one can piece together a picture of these two men as recluses, and very much as holy
recluses. What is the value of understanding the narrow practice of
only two in the midst of a phenomenon which spanned oceans, centuries and cultures? The stature of Chômei and Saigyô as two of the
most respected religious and literary ﬁgures in Japanese history might
seem reason enough in and of itself, for their inﬂuence was farreaching. However, that is to sell them short. The greater value in looking at their lives through their literary legacies lies in the very human
nature of the ascetic, reclusive existence that shows through: more
than some idealized, stale image of religious devotion and near-perfection (much as one tends to ﬁnd in hagiographical accounts of such famous ﬁgures), one sees two men who are vibrantly, palpably human
94
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and imperfect in spite of their best eﬀorts to dehumanize themselves
and disconnect themselves from the world. Their enduring popularity
and inﬂuence can be attributed in great measure to this humanity. To
study these two men and the way they struggle with their inner demons,
their connections to the world, their doubts, is to see the spiritual journey in its most pure, distilled form. Though these men are Buddhist
recluses, much of what can be gleaned from their lives is applicable
to reclusion in general, religious or otherwise, and provides valuable
insight into the phenomenon. That, in turn, provides a greater understanding of human spirituality as a whole and gives them relevance far
beyond their time and culture.
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The “Uniform Rule” and its
exceptions: a history of
Congressional naturalization
legislation
Daniel Rice
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Chief Justice Roger Taney
recognized that Congress wields this power positively to confer “on
an alien and his issue the rights and powers of a native-born citizen”
and negatively to eﬀect “the removal of the disabilities consequent on
foreign birth.”1 The word “Rule” in the Naturalization Clause seems to
be synonymous with “procedure,” and early naturalization laws in fact
decreed speciﬁc preconditions for naturalization – residence requirements, necessary oaths or aﬃrmations, and the like. Yet a curious dichotomy of inclusion versus exclusion developed alongside the laws’
substantive procedural components. Something about certain kinds
of aliens – be it their race, political convictions, marital customs, criminal habits, linguistic ignorance, or military cowardice – rendered them
inherently unﬁt for American citizenship by way of naturalization.The
story of American naturalization legislation is also a story about who
may and may not beneﬁt from Congress’s procedural determinations;
the “uniform rule” is a rule for eligible aspirants only.
In Part I of this article, I discuss the American colonial experience
with naturalization laws and account for the Naturalization Clause’s
1

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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inclusion in the Constitution. I then examine the historical development of Congress’s “uniform rule” and deconstruct the mechanism
by which certain groups have been excluded from and brought back
within its reach. Lastly, I scrutinize Congress’s posture towards expatriation, the logical converse of naturalization. In Part II, I ask why Congress might have thought it expedient to carve out statutory exceptions
to the naturalization procedures it had earlier prescribed, and I relate
the content of the two major kinds of historical exceptions to those
procedures: derivative citizenship for women and children and an expedited naturalization timeline for alien veterans.
My joint investigation of procedure, exclusion and reinclusion, expatriation, and exceptions should furnish the reader an ensemble of
rich perspectives from which to explore Congress’s unfolding exposition of the meaning of American citizenship. I argue that Congress has
often used its naturalization power to achieve nakedly partisan goals,
an enterprise aided by the absence of any constitutional limitations on
its procedural regulations. Congress has held prospective naturalized
citizens to a much higher moral and behavioral standard than naturalborn Americans, refusing to naturalize perpetrators of certain practices whose domestic criminalization would be ridiculed. The indiscriminate conferral of naturalization on certain non-white groups in
the antebellum period sidestepped the implied racial limitations of existing naturalization laws (and may have exceeded Congress’s powers
under the Naturalization Clause); Congress similarly contravened its
own pronouncement in declaring the existence of a natural right–complete discretionary expatriation – yet denying Americans its full enjoyment during wartime. Naturalization laws have often been propelled
by the need to eradicate absurdities and prejudicial anachronisms, one
of which threatened to hinder America’s prosecution of World War II.
And that citizenship could be transmitted and derived only through
husbands and fathers until 1934 plainly signals another way in which
women have been legally subordinate to men for much of American
history.

I: Congressional Naturalization Legislation
A. Historical Antecedents and Early Understandings
In 1740, Parliament passed a law enabling non-Britons residing in the
American colonies to acquire English citizenship, provided that they
24
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had resided in a particular colony for at least seven years, communed
in a Protestant congregation, and sworn an oath of allegiance to the
crown.2 Yet the 1740 statute did not expressly preempt contrary colonial legislation, and the American colonies continued to enact naturalization regulations more liberal than those speciﬁed by Parliament,
just as they had before the 1740 law.3 The contemporary slogan that
ours is a “nation of immigrants” has never applied more truthfully than
to pre-Revolutionary America. The need for additional settlers to cultivate untilled land, the likely military advantages ﬂowing from an enlarged reserve of able-bodied men,and other “generally acknowledged
beneﬁts of population growth” prompted colonial legislatures to entice European immigrants with the guarantee of quick naturalization.4
But an Order in Council issued on November 19, 1773 directed colonial governors to veto any new naturalization acts passed within their
jurisdictions, thereby subjecting yet another source of the American
colonists’ livelihood to the distant and untrammeled regulatory discretion of Parliament.5
Both native Englishmen and the American colonists discerned a
powerful linkage between territorial population and global political
power. The author Daniel Defoe argued in 1709, for example, that
“[p]eople are indeed the essential of commerce, and the more people
the more trade; the more trade, the more money; the more money, the
more strength; and the more strength, the greater the nation.”6 The
Philadelphia lawyer and heraldistWilliam Barton wrote in 1791,though
after the conclusion of American independence, that
[t]here is not, perhaps, any political axiom better established, than this, – That a high degree of population contributes greatly to the riches and strength of a state. In fact,
2
3

4
5
6

13 George II, c.7.
A Massachusetts law from April 2, 1731, for instance, provided that “all Protestants
of foreign nations, that have inhabited or resided within this province for the space
of one year, are hereby declared to be naturalized, to all intents, constructions and
purposes whatsoever.” See “document 3: Province Laws—Massachusetts (April 2,
1731)” in Michael Lemay and Elliot Barkan, eds., U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Laws and Issues: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 4.
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Ibid., 105.
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the progressive increase of numbers, in the people of any
civilized country, is reciprocally the cause and eﬀect of its
real wealth … that country, whose population is rapidly
advancing,may fairly be said to be increasing in both these
concomitants of national prosperity [riches and strength],
with proportionable celerity.7
In this context, the colonists’ solemn accusation in the Declaration
of Independence that King George III
has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States;
for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization
of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their
migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands
becomes quite comprehensible.
As the Articles of Confederation “expressly delegated” no power
respecting the naturalization of aliens to the Confederation Congress,
individual states remained free, as before 1773, to formulate their own
naturalization policies. Furthermore, the “free inhabitants” of each
state (excepting “paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice”)
were to “be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several States.”8 This resulted in a peculiar complication that
threatened to erode the incipient bonds of interstate comity: An immigrant might acquire the inviolable privileges of citizenship through
naturalization in the state erecting the fewest impediments to citizenship (e.g., an exceptionally short residence period), and the other
states, though they might presently deem the immigrant unﬁt for naturalization, were legally bound to respect the former state’s judgment.9
James Madison observed in Federalist 42 that “[t]he dissimilarity in
7

8
9

William Barton, “Observations on the probabilities of the Duration of Human Life,
and the progress of Population, in the United States of America; in a Letter from
William Barton, Esq., to David Rittenhouse, L.L.D. President, A.P.S.,” in Transactions
of the American Philosophical Society, Held at Philadelphia, For Promoting Useful Knowledge,
vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Robert Aitken & Son, 1792), 25. Barton was also the the primary
designer of the Great Seal of the United States.
Articles of Confederation, Article IV, Clause I.
As Justice Joseph Story characterized the situation in his widely read Commentaries,
“the laws of a single state were preposterously rendered paramount to the laws of all
the others, even within their own jurisdiction.” (Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States [Boston, MA: Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833], §537)
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the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system,” and Charles Pinckney argued in the dawning days of the Philadelphia Convention that the “Federal Government should also possess
the exclusive right of declaring on what terms the privileges of citizenship and naturalization should be extended to foreigners … To render
this power generally useful it must be placed in the Union.”10 There
is no surviving evidence that even a single Framer verbally dissented
from this principle at the Convention, and the Naturalization Clause,
having been approved without debate from the delegates after its submission by the Committee of Detail on August 6, was among the new
Constitution’s least controversial.11
The original Constitution employed the term “citizen” rather
sparsely. Save one exception, the document did not distinguish
between naturalized and natural-born citizens, but there is every reason to believe that the former were understood to be eligible to serve
in the House of Representatives and the Senate after reaching a sufﬁcient age, competent to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of federal courts in their capacity as citizens of individual states, and “entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”12
As legal scholar Akhil Amar has pointed out, the founding generation
knew well the immensity of the talent pool that might be sacriﬁced
if naturalized citizens were to be excluded from high legislative and
ministerial oﬃce. Seven of the Constitution’s thirty-nine signers were
foreign-born, as were three of the Supreme Court’s ﬁrst eight members (James Wilson, James Iredell, and William Paterson) and four of
the ﬁrst six secretaries of the treasury (most notably Alexander Hamil10
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James Madison, The Federalist No. 42, January 22, 1788; Charles Pinckney, “Observations On The Plan of Government Submitted to The Federal Convention, in Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787,” in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max
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Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, §537.
Article II, Section 1 stipulates that “[n]o person except a natural born Citizen, or a
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the Oﬃce of President.” This restriction remains in eﬀect today and
presumably excludes foreign-born American citizens from the vice presidency, as
well, yet it is unclear precisely how far down the line of succession this prohibition
extends. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright are both naturalized American citizens, yet their positions placed them fourth in line to the United States presidency by way of succession.
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ton and Albert Gallatin). Naturalized citizens also participated alongside natural-born Americans in the state ratifying conventions and so
were embraced in the Preamble’s crisp formulation of American sovereignty, the “People of the United States.”13
That Congress was granted plenary authority in the ﬁeld of naturalization legislation in no way determined that it would swiftly exercise
that power, but subsequent events seem to indicate that the Framers
understood the Naturalization Clause as something of a directive for
immediate action. George Washington cautioned in his First Annual
Message to Congress on January 8, 1790 that “[v]arious considerations
also render it expedient that the terms on which foreigners may be admitted to the rights of citizens, should be speedily ascertained by a uniform rule of naturalization.”14 Speedy ascertainment ensued, and the
House debates of February 3 and 4, which closely preceded the passage of the Naturalization Act of March 26, 1790, are remarkable for
their insight into the Representatives’ diversity of viewpoints and uncharacteristic humility.15 None of those assembled as a Committee of
the Whole had ever presided over the enactment of naturalization legislation – Theodore Sedgwick, a Federalist Representative from Massachusetts, “did not recollect an instance wherein gentlemen’s ideas
had been so various as on this occasion … from the want of understanding the subject” – and it appears that their utterances were informed
largely by their personal inclinations regarding the essence of American citizenship, the solemn obligations attending the enjoyment of
that citizenship, the desirability of population growth as an end in itself, and the assimilability of certain foreign elements.16

B. Procedural Elements of Naturalization Laws
The Naturalization Acts passed during the early Federal period established a framework by which aliens were to acquire American citizenship that endured without fundamental modiﬁcation for over a century. The Act of 1790 provided that “any Alien being a free white per13
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son” who had resided within the United States for two years could ﬁle a
petition for naturalization in any common-law court located in a state
in which he had resided for at least one year. After “making proof to
the satisfaction of such Court that he is a person of good character, and
taking the oath or aﬃrmation prescribed by law to support the Constitution of the United States,” such person would become a citizen of the
United States. There will be occasion later to discuss the discriminatory implications of the law’s “free white person” verbiage, but suﬃce
it to say here that the two-year residence period was evidently a compromise between those who desired to hold out every “inducement
to foreigners to come and settle among us” and others who believed
that “a term of four or seven years ought to be required” so that immigrants might not “tincture the system with the dregs of their former habits, and corrupt what we believe the most pure of all human institutions.”17 Alien reprobates were eﬀectively excluded from American citizenship by the good-character provision, and the residence and
oath-of-allegiance requirements would help ensure naturalized citizens’ ﬁtness as members of an exceptional civic community.18 Scholars have also noted that Congress’s devolution of the actual task of naturalization upon state and local courts paradoxically advanced the Naturalization Clause’s uniformity requirement,for it ostensibly ruled out
ad hoc legislative conferrals of citizenship on individual supplicants.19
The uniformity principle, in turn, would aﬀord prospective immigrants a certain psychological security – once “uniform” and “established,” America’s one rule of naturalization (and nothing else) was to
govern the process by which they became fully incorporated into the
polity.20
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The Naturalization Act of January 29, 1795 made one substantive alteration to the law of 1790 and imposed four additional requirements
for the acquisition of American citizenship beyond what the former
had stipulated.21 Alien denizens were thereafter made to ﬁle a declaration of intention three years in advance of their applications for citizenship. The U.S.-residence requirement was increased from two to
ﬁve years. Applicants were compelled to relinquish any hereditary titles previously bestowed on them and renounce all allegiance to their
former sovereigns.22 Lastly, prospective citizens would have to convince a court of their “attach[ment] to the principles of the constitution of the United States” and proper disposition toward the “good order and happiness” of the American form of government.As the French
Revolution sank into butchery and began to devour its children, the
prospect of a thriving Jacobin émigré population in America became
a source of acute disquietude for Federalists, and so the 1795 Act was
meant to ensure immigrants’ ﬁdelity to republican principles of the
New World variety.23
And those immigrants, all understood, were far more likely to join
the Democratic-Republican rather than the Federalist Party once they
had acceded to the full privileges of citizenship. The more stringent
Naturalization Act of June 18, 1798, an integral component of the nowinfamous Alien and Sedition Acts passed during America’s undeclared
naval war with France, furnishes further evidence that Congress used
its naturalization power at this time to inoculate the body politic
against foreign elements ideologically hostile to the incumbent administration.24 All agreed that “at a time when we may very shortly be involved in war, there are an immense number of French citizens in our
country,” and the national-security concerns precipitated by the Quasi-War aﬀorded Federalists a magniﬁcent opportunity to award themselves a competitive electoral advantage under the pretense of national
self-preservation.25 The U.S.-residence period was raised from ﬁve to
21
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fourteen years and that in a particular state from two to ﬁve. Henceforth, a declaration of intention would be required ﬁve (rather than
three) years in advance, and the channels of naturalization were closed
oﬀ entirely to subjects of nations with which the United States might
ﬁnd itself at war. The Act of 1798 also created a comprehensive registry
of current and future resident aliens; clerks of courts that received declarations of intention and eﬀected individual naturalizations were required to certify and transmit all relevant documentation to the Secretary of State (a post then held by the High Federalist Timothy Pickering). It is no small irony that President Adams, who had twenty-two
years earlier risked life and limb to denounce the Crown’s “endeavour[ing] to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners,” signed into law a
naturalization bill mandating a probationary residence period twice
that of the 1740 act of Parliament.
President Jeﬀerson used the occasion of his First Annual Message
to Congress, like Washington before him, to arouse Congress into action on the issue of naturalization. Jeﬀerson waxed philosophical in inquiring whether we shall “refuse the unhappy fugitives from distress
that hospitality which the savages of the wilderness extended to our
fathers arriving in this land? Shall oppressed humanity ﬁnd no asylum on this globe?”26 Embedded in Jeﬀerson’s soaring rhetoric was an
presidential plea that his newly empowered Democratic-Republican
foot soldiers overturn the onerous 1798 law in order to ease the assimilation of ideologically amenable European immigrants. The Naturalization Act of April 14, 1802 was essentially identical to its immediate
predecessor save four telling revisions: An applicant was now to declare on oath two (rather than ﬁve) years before his admission to citizenship that it was “bona ﬁde his intention to become a citizen of the
United States.”27 The U.S.-residence requirement was reduced from
fourteen years to ﬁve (where it has remained for over two-hundred
years) and the state-residence requirement from ﬁve years to one. In
these three respects, the Act of 1802 was at least as procedurally liberal
as the 1795 law. Lastly, participating courts were relieved of the responsibility to convey their naturalization records to the Department of
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State. A sympathetic constitutional historian once described the act as
“epoch-making,” the original justiﬁcation for electioneering slogans
to the eﬀect that “the Democratic party enfranchised the white man”
and would continue to be “the immigrant’s best friend.”28 Jeﬀersonians in the Seventh Congress, like Federalists in the Fifth, turned the
power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization to their own political advantage (though in response to the Federalists’ provocation). It
should also be noted that the Democratic-Republicans were perfectly
content to use the federal legislative power to expand the rolls of a party
membership hostile to the unnecessary exercise of federal legislative
power.
The Constitution fully permits the creation of a uniform rule of
naturalization that transparently serves the interests of a particular political party. Congress’s naturalization power is apparently self-contained and subject to no check other than that which the body may
impose on itself. The courts could have no possible justiﬁcation for
striking down as unconstitutional any law which merely announced
the process by which a foreigner may acquire U.S. citizenship, whether
it prohibited naturalization entirely or enabled alien tourists to become citizens after riding Space Mountain, for there exists no constitutional text or subconstitutional doctrine that might be plausibly interpreted to reduce Congressional discretion in this area.29 Aliens are
sometimes entitled to remedies in American courts when they have received discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis American citizens, but the
Naturalization Clause is not litigable on Equal Protection grounds, as
citizens receive no “treatment” to speak of from laws that aﬀect the
expectations and opportunities only of non-citizens.30 The judiciary is
also powerless, by its nature, to pass on the mere prudence of inadvisably burdensome naturalization regulations. Given that our popularly
28
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Francis Newton Thorpe, A Constitutional History of the American People (New York, NY:
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The Supreme Court has summarized the situation as follows: “Naturalization is a
privilege, to be given, qualiﬁed, or withheld as Congress may determine, and which
the alien may claim as of right only upon compliance with the terms which Congress
imposes.” United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
At ﬁrst glance, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment seems
only to curb the discretion of state governments, but it has also been interpreted as
a limitation on federal power through a process called “reverse incorporation” anchored in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). The Fourteenth Amendment was not ratiﬁed until decades after the
1798 and 1802 laws, to be sure.
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elected Congress need not worry about external assaults on the continuous functioning of its naturalization legislation once it has been
enacted, one might expect naturalization laws to mirror public opinion at least as closely as in any other ﬁeld into which Congress might
enter. So it should come as no surprise that although the words “establish” and “uniform” connote principled promulgations of relative
permanence, Congress has occasionally used its naturalization power
to further the interests of transient political majorities.
After 1802, not a single major revision of naturalization procedures
occurred for over a century. The Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906
eﬀected a fundamental transformation in the process by which aliens
were to acquire American citizenship, its purpose evidently being “to
guard more jealously the portals of citizenship.”31 The 59th Congress
contained nearly two Republicans for every Democrat, and the 1906
law surely decelerated the enfranchisement of a critical Democratic
constituency, just as the Federalists’ 1798 law had done. Whereas in
some large coastal cities “Democratic judges [had] obligingly issued
naturalization papers almost as soon as immigrants got oﬀ the boat”
(the desire to preclude individual gatekeepers from perpetrating partisan shenanigans undoubtedly motivated many proponents of the original House bill, H.R. 15442), after 1906 federal courts alone were competent to naturalize aliens.32 Those courts were obliged to accept only
standardized petition forms containing such detailed information as
an immigrant’s occupation, age, place of birth, and present and former
addresses, the name of the vessel and the date on which he arrived, and
the names and residences of his spouse and children. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization was established within the Department
of Commerce and Labor to superintend all matters concerning the naturalization of aliens. The privilege of naturalization would thereafter
be denied to aliens “who cannot speak the English language.” Applicants were to present to a judge the aﬃdavits of two witnesses personally attesting to the petitioner’s good character and continuous residence in the United States for the past ﬁve years. Bureau oﬃcials would
conduct an investigation and submit their ﬁndings to the court, and,
assuming a judge found those recommendations satisfactory, the ap31
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plicant would then take the requisite oaths of allegiance and renunciation. Prior to 1906, immigrants could be naturalized in any state or
local court of record, and during that time both declarations of intent
and petitions for naturalization “varied in content and wording from
court to court, county to county, year to year.”33 Although Congress
had mandated certain prerequisites for naturalization long before1906,
it did not until that year prescribe mechanisms by which its chosen
rule might truly be rendered uniform in practice.
The next major piece of legislation aﬀecting the procedural framework of naturalization was the Nationality Act of October 14, 1940,
which aimed “[t]o revise and codify the nationality laws of the United
States into a comprehensive nationality code.”34 A presidential committee of State, Justice, and Labor Department representatives had
toiled for ﬁve years to consolidate and amend a set of regulations “heretofore scattered among a large number of statutes with frequent inconsistencies and anachronisms.”35 The Act codiﬁed more than it revised,
but what procedural changes were made conformed to the pattern of
administrative centralization in the naturalization of aliens. The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was to “have charge of
the administration of the naturalization laws,” and the Act authorized
him to “make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
[the law] into eﬀect.” The notion of a comprehensive registry of aliens
arriving in the United States was resurrected and mandated anew. No
immigrant could thereafter petition for admission to citizenship without furnishing both a certiﬁcate of arrival and two identifying personal
photographs. Declarations of intention and petitions for naturalization were to consist merely of sixty-one and seventy-one blanks to be
ﬁlled, respectively. The 1940 Act also left no question as to which American territorial residents became citizens at birth and which ethnicities
were eligible for naturalization.
The last key example of procedurally salient naturalization legislation, the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (also known
as the McCarran-Walter Act),was enacted during the height of the Cold
War over President Truman’s veto.36 In some respects liberalizing and
33
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in others restrictive, its most signiﬁcant provisions were those barring
Communists and other political undesirables from entry into the United States and forbidding racial discrimination in the naturalization of
aliens (to be discussed further). But McCarran-Walter also included
a thorough restatement of naturalization procedures on the model of
the 1940 Act. On top of the earlier English-proﬁciency requirement,
prospective citizens would now have to possess “a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of history, and of the principles and
form of government, of the United States.” Today’s mandatory written citizenship test originated from this clause. The Attorney General,
rather than the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
(whose bureau was transferred to the Department of Justice), was delegated tremendous authority to “make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry into eﬀect the provisions” of Chapter II, that
pertaining to nationality through naturalization. Lastly, the necessity
of ﬁling a declaration of intention as a prelude to one’s formal application for citizenship was permanently eliminated, though many applicants have since done so out of homage to the practice’s history and
symbolic meaning.
Professor Alexander Bickel once described law as “the sediment of
history.”37 This metaphor neatly beﬁts that class of statutes stipulating
procedural requirements for naturalization. Today’s prospective citizens must satisfy prerequisites conceived in the wake of the Thermidorian Reaction, the ﬁrst interparty transfer of power in American history, the great waves of immigration in the late 19th century, and the
onset of McCarthyism.“Sedimentary” provisions once deemed politically expedient or justiﬁed by now-obsolete national-security concerns
have accumulated to form today’s “uniform rule” for the acquisition
of American citizenship.Candidates thus indirectly interact with some
of the most meaningful themes and episodes of United States history
as they strive to demonstrate a working knowledge of that history’s
fundamentals.

C. Eligibility for Naturalization
In establishing the terms by which aliens may be admitted to citizenship, naturalization legislation has also functioned to exclude certain
classiﬁcations of people from that privilege on moral, ideological, and
37
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racial grounds. Exclusions have been accomplished either through express prohibitory language or by plain implication, as when particular
groups were widely understood not to possess one or more attributes
presumed to be necessary for acquiring citizenship.
1. Moral and Ideological Exclusion
From the outset, the Naturalization Act of 1790 (and all that succeeded
it) rendered aliens unable to demonstrate their “good character” ineligible for full civic assimilation. From 1795 on, naturalization was reserved only for those “attached to the principles of the constitution of
the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness
of the same.” The Anarchist Exclusion Act of March 3, 1903, which
passed not long after the assassination of President William McKinley
on September 14, 1901, barred from naturalization aliens philosophically allergic to the principle of organized government or who were
members of anarchist organizations.38 It was no defense that an anarchist had never acted on his convictions and had resided peacefully
in the United States for years; if his conscience disposed him to hold
legislatively proscribed opinions, he was unable to consummate his
chosen American identity. The Act of 1906 reaﬃrmed these provisions
and also excluded “polygamist[s] or believer[s] in the practice of polygamy” and, as previously mentioned, aliens “who cannot speak the English language.”39 At a time when women’s marriages to American citizens automatically invested them with citizenship, the Immigration
Act of 1917 provided that females “of the sexually immoral classes”
(prostitutes) could not obtain expedited citizenship in this fashion. 40
Convicted alien military and naval deserters were declared ineligible
for citizenship by the Act of 1940. Lastly, the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952 forbade the naturalization of all advocates of the establishment
of a totalitarian dictatorship, including Communists. It also clariﬁed
that adulterers, habitual drunkards and gamblers, convicted murder38
39
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ers, petitioners who lied to expedite their naturalizations, and aliens
who had spent at least 180 days in jail during their United States residences were not of “good moral character” and were thus unsuitable
for citizenship.
Prophylactic laws of this sort, read alongside cognate procedural
requirements depicted above, ask much more of candidates for naturalization than Congress ever could of natural-born citizens. One recent survey suggests that nearly two-ﬁfths of Americans would fail the
U.S. citizenship test.41 No American native could be imprisoned or expelled merely for his foolish lifestyle choices, nor do legal consequences attach to private imprecations on the Constitution and the
system of government it creates. It is as if Congress knows it cannot
coerce natural-born citizens into tailoring their beliefs and actions to
suit some imagined ideal of American citizenship, so it will do all it legitimately can to ensure that interested aliens fortify our loftiest moral
and philosophical conceptions of ourselves.
2. Racial Eligibility
Congressional activity on the issue of naturalization as it relates to the
imposition and removal of racially and nationally based civil disabilities may be organized broadly into four categories:legislation expressly
prohibiting certain alien groups from acquiring U.S. citizenship; laws
insinuating that candidates of a certain skin color need not apply for
naturalization; legislation and treaties conferring citizenship instantly
and indiscriminately on certain groups of people, seemingly without
regard to their race and in spite of the constitutional directive that Congress “establish an uniform Rule”; and laws merely enabling particular
ethnic and national groups to petition for naturalization on the same
basis as “free white persons.” Up until 1952, when racial discrimination in naturalization was at last disallowed, Congress regularly acted
to modify the application of its earlier naturalization laws and thereby
alleviate a host of perceived anachronisms. It simply would not have
been possible for our earliest statesmen to have prescribed a compre41

“When newsweek recently asked 1,000 U.S. citizens to take America’s oﬃcial citizenship test, 29 percent couldn’t name the vice president. Seventy-three percent
couldn’t correctly say why we fought the Cold War. Forty-four percent were unable
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a calendar.” See Andrew Romano, “How Dumb Are We?,” Newsweek, March 20, 2011,
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hensive and uniform rule of naturalization that was to endure wholesale in the face of rapidly changing social conditions. While the under-

Figure 1: Opening lines of an original printed copy of the Naturalization Act of 1795, clearly showing the “free
white person” limitation formulated ﬁve years earlier.
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/
From
naturalization/naturalization_page1.html (accessed 1/26/11).
lying procedural framework of naturalization may have been swiftly
ascertained and left largely unaltered for decades, the number and precise identity of the legitimate subjects of that process lingered in an unsettling state of indeterminacy for a century and a half. What follows
is a rough chronology of this ad hoc adventure.
The terms of the very ﬁrst Naturalization Act applied to “any Alien
being a free white person,” and, presumably, only to that group. After 1790, then, all indentured servants and non-whites were incapable
of being naturalized by their own eﬀorts. Charles Gordon has pointed
out that the First Congress was very much a legislature of its time:
When the 1790 law was drafted, the nation’s population included only
whites, blacks, and Native Americans, the ﬁrst group alone being
deemed ﬁt for naturalization. The Framers “did not envisage the vast
38
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army of immigrants who were destined to ﬂock to our shores.”42 Unless and until Congress more clearly deﬁned which groups were eligible or broadened the scope of its original language, it fell to the courts
to determine whether certain national groups were “free white persons” within the meaning of the 1790 law. (Interestingly enough, in
his infamous Dred Scott opinion, Chief Justice Taney cited the Naturalization Act of 1790 as evidence that “citizenship at [the time of the
founding] was perfectly understood to be conﬁned to the white race;
and that they alone constituted the sovereignty in the Government.”)
The Louisiana Purchase Treaty of April 30, 1803 and the AdamsOnís Treaty of February 22, 1819 guaranteed to inhabitants of the territories acquired from France and Spain, respectively, all of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of the United States–in short,
a kind of de facto national citizenship, though the recipients did not
yet enjoy even state citizenship. It is unclear whether (yet is exceedingly unlikely that) the U.S. government intended to elevate by treaty
the civic stature of Native Americans residing in these territories. On
September 27, 1830, however, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek permitted patriarchs of the Choctaw tribe to become citizens of the United States merely by expressing their desire to do so. An Act of March
3, 1843 declared all members of the Stockbridge Indian tribe “citizens
of the United States, to all intents and purposes,” and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo of February 2, 1848 stipulated that those formerly
Mexican inhabitants of territory now in the United States’ possession
would acquire the “title and rights” of “citizens of the United States”
merely by continuing to reside within that territory and not publicly
electing to retain their Mexican citizenship.43 One scholar has remarked that measures of this nature “bestowed American citizenship
upon considerable numbers of persons who would have been racially
ineligible for naturalization under normal procedures”; Taney himself
observed that “[o]n the question of citizenship … we have not been
very fastidious.”44 Absent intermarriage, Native Americans were manifestly not “whites.” These four treaties and the Stockbridge Indian
Act foreshadowed later inconsistencies between what the governing
naturalization statutes seemed to allow and what groups were in fact
42
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Figure 2: Lyman Trumbull’s deﬁning amendment to the proposed legislation that became the Civil Rights Act of 1866. National
Archives, Center for Legislative Archives. (Author’s photo)
permitted to be naturalized through case-by-case Congressional exemptions.
It is ﬁtting here to discuss a revolutionary moment in the history of
jus soli (“right of the soil,” or territorial birthright citizenship). In discarding one of Dred Scott’s central holdings –that native-born AfricanAmericans were not citizens of the United States at birth – the constitutional innovations of Reconstruction inadvertently created an injustice ameliorable only through a revision of naturalization laws. Exslaves did not automatically become American citizens following the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratiﬁcation on December 6, 1865. Congressional Republicans, however,“equated the status and rights of free people with the status and natural rights of citizens.”45 Republicans used
their overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate to pass the Civil
Rights Act of April 9, 1866, which proclaimed that “all persons born in
the United States … excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States.”46 This guarantee was constitutionalized two years later in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”
45
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After the Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark that the Fourteenth Amendment’s language embraced even native-born members
of a racial group expressly forbidden from naturalization – in short,
that the Amendment meant what it said – there arose the absurdity
of having “to justify the preclusion of parents from enjoyment of citizenship beneﬁts which are available to their children.”47 The Act of
1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment begat an equally untenable inequity: African-Americans born in the United States became citizens
at birth, while those born abroad could never acquire American citi-

Figure 3: Antebellum petition to Congress praying for an extension
of naturalization laws to “colored foreigners.” National
Archives, Center for Legislative Archives. (Author’s photo)
47

169 U.S. 649 (1898). Chinese-American birthright citizenship was at issue in Wong
Kim Ark. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Melville Fuller posited a critical
connection between operative naturalization legislation and a proper constitutional
understanding of jus soli: While the Fourteenth Amendment envisions birthright
citizenship for American-born children of permanent American residents “who
might themselves become citizens,” he argued, it does not “arbitrarily make citizens of children born in the United States of parents who, according to the will
of their native government and of this Government, are and must remain aliens.”
In other words, despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s unexceptionably clear verbiage, Fuller’s jus soli applies only to those categories of “persons”—whites and
blacks—racially eligible to become full naturalized citizens. The majority holding of
Wong Kim Ark is central to the contemporary debate over whether the Constitution
should be amended to deny birthright citizenship to the oﬀspring of illegal immigrants; Gordon, “The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship,” 246.
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zenship. The Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870 “hereby extended [the
naturalization laws] to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”48 As the ﬁrst generally applicable federal statute in American history explicitly entitling any other than non-white aliens to seek
the privilege of American citizenship, the Act of 1870 constituted a paradigm shift in the ﬁeld of naturalization legislation.
Yet Congressional opinion did not uniformly favor relaxation of
citizenship laws. During a Senate debate on an early version of the bill
that became the Civil Rights Act of 1866, several members astutely perceived that strict adherence to jus soli would bestow American citizenship on Chinese and Mongolians born within our borders. Senator Peter Van Winkle (R-OH) did
not see where it comes in that we are bound to receive into
our community those whose mingling with us might be
detrimental to our interests. I do not believe that a superior race is bound to receive among it those of an inferior
race if the mingling of them can only tend to the detriment
of the mass.49
If “Asiatics” should be admitted to citizenship, argued Senator Edgar Cowan (R-PA), “there is an end to republican government” in California, “because it is very well ascertained that those people have no
appreciation of that form of government; it seems to be obnoxious to
their very nature.”50 Whether unfamiliar races became citizensby birth
or naturalization mattered not; each course deﬂowered America’s civic chastity irrevocably.Section 14 of the Chinese Exclusion Act,passed
on May 16, 1882, legally ordained these prejudices: “hereafter no State
court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship.”51 Despite the manifold achievements of Reconstruction, the Act
was unmistakably premised upon the belief that whites were “a superior race” vis-à-vis the Chinese. After 1882, then, qualiﬁed whites and
blacks were clearly capable of becoming naturalized citizens; without
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question, Chinese were not.52 Yet the Orient was not a Chinese monolith–immigrants from elsewhere in East Asia, the Indian subcontinent,
and Paciﬁc island nations arrived in the United States armed with the
reality that, although the naturalization laws had not yet technically
been “extended” to them, neither had any prohibitory language yet
foreclosed their naturalization as in the case of the Chinese.
This semantic diﬃculty was partially resolved in favor of citizenship for residents of certain American territories and dependencies,
many of whom were non-white (within the meaning of the very ﬁrst
naturalization laws) and not of African descent.The Hawaiian Organic
Act of April 30, 1900 declared all who were citizens of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, the date of its annexation, to be citizens of the United
States.53 Following a presidential visit to Puerto Rico, Theodore Roosevelt issued a special message to Congress on December 11, 1906 in
which he expressed “the desirability of conferring full American citizenship upon” the inhabitants of that island.54 Congress belatedly granted his wish on March 2, 1917 with its passage of the JonesShafroth Act.55 United States Virgin Island natives were collectively
naturalized on February 25, 1927, and Guam residents were made U.S.
citizens on August 1, 1950.56 Did these actions indicate that Congress
did not understand the naturalization laws then in eﬀect to erect an absolute bar to the naturalization of all non-whites and non-blacks
through the regular channels?
The U.S. Supreme Court did not think so. In rapid succession, it
held that Japanese, Hindus, and Filipinos were not “whites” and thus
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could not become naturalized U.S. citizens.57 One might reason that
the Court was merely fulﬁlling its duty to ensure uniformity in the legal
system by clarifying the reach of certain statutory provisions in cases
that come before it, but the spectacle of nine white male patrician-jurists opining on the most delicate anthropological questions of the day
became too ridiculous for some observers. As “white person” cases
began to percolate through the judiciary, lower federal courts struggled mightily to dispose of petitioners’ requests in a principled fashion. Some federal district courts deferred to popular conceptions of
the word “white” in resolving these cases, while others sought anchorage in the technical writings of ethnologists. A Parsi, a Syrian, a Hindu,
and an Armenian were admitted to citizenship in the early 20th century by courts that interpreted “white” to include all supposed members of the “Aryan race”; the Supreme Court eventually held that the
statutory phrase “free white persons” should be construed “in accordance with the understanding of the common man, synonymous with
the word ‘Caucasian’ only as that word is popularly understood.”58
Such confusion was the result of the limited purview and attendant
uncertainties of previous naturalization laws, ones that addressed only
the statuses of Chinese, blacks, and the whites of a bygone era in a nation growing more racially heterogeneous by the year.
Section 28(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924 purportedly clariﬁed
the scope of the phrase “ineligible to citizenship”: It was coextensive
with the mass of individuals “debarred from becoming a citizen of the
United States” under Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 and
the Chinese Exclusion Act.59 But Section 2169 expressly debarred no
one. Its provisions addressed eligibility, and they applied “to aliens being free white persons, and to persons of African nativity and persons
of African descent,” consigning the issue of non-Chinese exclusion to
the endless litigation over Congressional implication. Section 303 of
the Nationality Act of 1940 stipulated that “[t]he right to become a naturalized citizen … shall extend only to white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the
Western Hemisphere” [italics mine]. For the ﬁrst time, Congress explicitly placed all non-white and non-black aliens of the Orient on the
57
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same legal footing as Chinese nationals, yet it ingloriously failed to deﬁne the least-understood term in American nationality law: whiteness.
Naturalization legislation,like that pertaining to immigration,necessarily aﬀects a nation’s foreign relations.And racially discriminatory
naturalization legislation, especially that which disadvantages nationals of a state upon whose assistance one vitally depends, can have harmful diplomatic and military consequences. The Reich Citizenship Law
of September 15, 1935 limited German citizenship to “that subject only
who is of German or kindred blood.”60 So it was that at the onset of
World War II, Nazi Germany and the United States were the only two
countries in the world in which one’s race might be suﬃcient to exclude one from naturalization. As Earl Harrison bitterly observed in
1944 upon resigning as U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, “all will agree that this is not very desirable company.”61
The United States was thus highly vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy throughout its participation in the War for ﬁghting injustice abroad while countenancing it at home, a charge that recurred throughout the overlapping years of the Cold War and the Civil Rights movement.62
An October 12, 1943 New York Times article reported that the Japanese had initiated a propaganda campaign designed to undermine
the Sino-American wartime partnership by broadcasting the contents
of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Indeed, pronouncements from our highest legislative and judicial institutions had forbidden the naturalization of nationals of China and the Philippines, both key allies (and the
ﬁrst line of defense) in America’s ﬁght against Japan. In a special message delivered the day before the New York Times article was published,
President Roosevelt urged Congress to take swift action on a pending
bill designed to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act.Roosevelt denounced
the 1882 Act as an “injustice,” one of the great “anachronisms” and
“mistakes of the past.” He perceived a direct and debilitating connec60
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tion between the Exclusion Act, “the spirit of [China’s] people,” and
“her faith in her Allies”; repeal would be morally redemptive as well
as militarily expedient.63 As thousands of Japanese-American citizens
languished in their own nation’s internment camps, the Chinese Exclusion Act was erased from the statue books on December 17, 1943 in
the form of the Magnuson Act.64 The Luce-Celler Act of July 2, 1946,
passed two days before President Truman’s proclamation of Philippine independence and after the relentless agitation of Dalip Singh
Saund’s Indian Association of America, enabled Filipino-Americans
and subcontinent Indian-Americans to become naturalized citizens,
as well.65
Even at this late stage, over a century and a half after the Naturalization Act of 1790 was enacted, Congress was still carving out ad hoc
exceptions to its increasingly malleable “uniform rule” with respect
to ethnicities and nationalities – that whites and blacks could become
naturalized citizens, while members of all other racial groups not indigenous to the Western Hemisphere could not. Each inclusionary alteration of the “established” naturalization scheme was essentially a
national admission that certain groups were legitimately entitled to
that from which they had only recently been statutorily forbidden.
Surely, then, a process that has accommodated a gradual desertion of
timeworn racial prejudices is to be preferred over a sclerotic regime in
which a fully uniform and predictable yet injuriously outmoded rule of
naturalization prevails. In any case, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952
deﬁnitively repudiated America’s troublesome legacy of racialized citizenship in declaring that “[t]he right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race.”
3. American Indians and Citizenship
The Native American experience with respect to U.S. citizenship has
been quite diﬀerent from those of other demographic minorities. The
Supreme Court ruled in 1884 that, although born within the territorial
limits of the United States, Indians were members of “alien nations,
63
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Fred Warren Riggs, Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 211.
57 Stat. 600.
60 Stat. 416. Saund later served as the ﬁrst Asian-American member of Congress. He
represented California’s 29th Congressional district from 1957–1963.

46

daniel rice – “the uniform rule” and its exceptions

distinct political communities.”66 As such, they were not “subject to
the jurisdiction” of the United States and thus did not become citizens
at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment; jus soli had its limits, after
all. Yet two years later, the Court upheld an act of Congress that recognized federal jurisdiction for ﬁfteen major crimes committed by one
Native American against another in tribal territory.67 “These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation,” Justice Samuel Miller wrote for
an unanimous Court whose membership had not changed since 1884.
Not because of any particular constitutional provision, but “[f]rom
their very weakness and helplessness … there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.” The Supreme Court thus denied the existence of federal jurisdiction over Native Americans for purposes of
substantiating their claims of birthright citizenship, only to permit the
exercise of that very jurisdiction in a case that legitimized an impending assimilation policy that eventually mandated full Native American
birthright citizenship.
Assured of the constitutionality of federal Indian legislation, Congress passed the Indian General Allotment (or Dawes) Act on February
8, 1887.68 The law primarily sought to “civilize” the Native peoples by
abolishing proprietary customs that purportedly inhibited their cultural and economic advancement; enhanced agricultural production
would undoubtedly beneﬁt the Indians’ assimilators, as well.69 The
Dawes Act authorized the president to subdivide Indian reservations
and redistribute them as separate tracts of land for individual tribal
members. It then “declared to be a citizen of the United States” any
Indian who was granted an allotment of land or reestablished “his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and ha[d]
adopted the habits of civilized life.” It was unclear, however, whether
Indians became citizens immediately upon receiving their allotments
or after the twenty-ﬁve-year period in which the federal government
held their allotments in trust. The Burke Act of May 8, 1906 explained
that allottees were to become citizens automatically at the end of the
twenty-ﬁve year trust period, unless they received a fee-simple patent
66
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from the secretary of the interior before that time.70 By an Act of August 9, 1888, furthermore, an Indian woman who married a U.S. citizen
was to acquire citizenship by that means.71
This trend toward the full cultural assimilation of Native Americans culminated with the passage of the Snyder Act on June 2, 1924.72
Nearly two-thirds of all Native Americans had become U.S. citizens
through earlier laws and treaties, but many of those who had elected to
remain tribal members through proud and determined volition ﬁercely opposed the Snyder Act, which, in conferring citizenship retrospectively and prospectively on “all non-citizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United States,” eﬀectively expatriated them
from their “distinct political communities” without their consent.73
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not say that persons born
within the United States but not subject to its jurisdiction cannot become citizens, only that ones born in the United States and answerable to its laws deﬁnitively are. There is thus nothing unconstitutional
about the Snyder Act or the kindred laws preceding it, for they served
to ﬁll a constitutional cavity without violating its text. The principle
of jus soli at last became universal in United States territory with the
Nationality Act of 1940, which declared newborns of “Eskimo” and
“Aleutian” (as distinguished from “Indian”) tribes to be U.S. citizens.
As full Native American citizenship occurred without a constitutional
amendment, there is no doubt that the Snyder Act and its cohorts functionally overruled Elk v. Wilkins through an implicit legislative gloss to
the eﬀect that subjection to the jurisdiction of the United States was no
longer necessary for obtaining citizenship by birth.

D. Expatriation
Congress has undoubtedly made liberal use of its power to establish
the terms by which foreigners may become naturalized U.S. citizens.
It has also exercised, on occasion, what might be inferred as a corollary of its plenary authority in the ﬁeld of naturalization – the power
to establish a uniform rule of expatriation, the process by which the
bonds of allegiance between an individual and his former state are dis70
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solved, with an accompanying loss of citizenship. Since the Constitution’s ratiﬁcation, the American government has had a powerful incentive to articulate a credible philosophical defense of the eﬀectuality of individual expatriations. The more cumbersome and consentcontingent the process, the less readily deserving foreigners can exchange their alien allegiances for the lifelong opportunity to enrich the
United States economically and intellectually, and the more impotent
Congress’s power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. If expatriation cannot occur on the one end, naturalization cannot on the
other (at least not without major diplomatic commotion). Providing
a statutory roadmap for Americans’ self-denaturalizations has always
been much less of a Congressional priority.
In the American republic’s ﬂedgling years, English common law
dictated that natural-born Britons remained British subjects until
death, notwithstanding any attempt to evade military service through
naturalization abroad.74 That Old World hegemons dismissed other
nations’ naturalizations of their citizens as illegitimate became increasingly problematic after the adoption of the Constitution and Congress’s expeditious exercise of its naturalization power. When the two
came into conﬂict, the policies of Britain and the United States in this
respect were irreconcilable. To have endorsed Britain’s position on expatriation, even in the abstract, would have been to insist that Congress abjectly refrain from exercising a constitutional power expressly
granted to it. Many early Federalists actually repudiated the doctrine
of expatriation as inimical to the law of nations, the Hamiltonian position being captured most emphatically by Representative Zephaniah
Swift (CT):
Allegiance is a duty which mankind own and which they
can never renounce and disclaim without the consent and
concurrence of the supreme power of the state. … let a
man remove himself into whatever country he pleases, he
continues to owe allegiance to his native country, and is
punishable for high treason for joining its enemies and
levying war upon it.75
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Congress instituted a regime of naturalization at an early hour, of
course, and in so doing implicitly (and audaciously) denied that foreign sovereigns could demand perpetual allegiance of transatlantic emigrants. After the Royal Navy began impressing purported expatriates
stationed on American vessels into its service during the Napoleonic
Wars, President Jeﬀerson wrote to Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
that “I hold the right of expatriation to be inherent in every man by
the laws of nature … the individual may [exercise such right] by any effectual and unequivocal act or declaration.”76 No public act emanated
from Jeﬀerson’s sentiment for over sixty years, but it was an article of
faith among subsequent generations of American statesmen and diplomats.77
In the mid-1860s, naturalized Americans were conscripted into the
French and Prussian Armies while visiting relatives in their former homelands.78 President Andrew Johnson concluded his Second
Annual Message of December 3, 1866 with a request for
an assertion by Congress of the principle so long maintained by the executive department that naturalization by
one state fully exempts the native-born subject of any other state from the performance of military service under
any foreign government.
On April 12, 1867, two naturalized American citizens, John Warren and
Augustine Costello, set sail from New York to participate in the socalled “Jacmel Expedition,” a Fenian campaign to raise an armed insurrection in Ireland. Warren and Costello were detained and sentenced
by the British government under the Treason Felony Act of 1848, not76
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withstanding their earlier acquisition of American citizenship and renunciation of all prior allegiances. British judges, of course, deemed
those relinquishments ineﬀectual and even cited learned exemplars
of the Federalist position on expatriation as supposed conﬁrmation
that American statesmen championed full discretionary expatriation
selectively.79 This “singular and embarrassing conﬂict of laws,” Presi-

Figure 4: Opening lines of H.R. 768, “A Bill concerning the rights of
American citizens in foreign states,” which became the Expatriation Act of 1868. National Archives, Center for Legislative
Archives. (Author’s photo)
dent Johnson complained in his Third Annual Message of December 3,
1867, “perplexes the public mind concerning the rights of naturalized
citizens and impairs the national authority abroad.” With evident exasperation, Johnson again “appeal[ed] to Congress to declare the national will unmistakably upon this important question.”
Congress ﬁnally responded with the Expatriation Act of July 27,
1868, its ﬁrst ever pronouncement on the subject.80 Echoing Jeﬀerson
in more ways than one, the law’s preamble aﬃrmed that “the right of
expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable
to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Any oﬃcial act that appeared to undercut this sacrosanct individual right was thereby “declared inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of this government.” The law did not specify any penalties
for high-ranking deviants or ﬂesh out the logistics of voluntary expatriation; it was, just as Johnson had requested, merely an assertion of
principle. The content of the Expatriation Act of 1868 must have come
79
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as no surprise to its intended audience – world powers that rejected
the very notion of expatriation – but the medium for articulating this
sentiment was a novel one. The Act furnished a bold restatement of
Congress’s naturalization power, for in condemning as unjust the doctrine that an individual is powerless to relinquish his citizenship, it accorded primacy to systems of political theory in which nothing operates to obstruct a state’s ability to naturalize aliens.
It was not until the 20th century that Congress acknowledged the
eﬃcacy of individual American expatriations on the same terms as
those of foreigners desirous of acquiring American citizenship.81 On
July 3, 1906, Acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon, pursuant to a recommendation of the House Committee on Foreign Aﬀairs, appointed
a three-member board of experts to inquire into the existing expatriation laws and propose legislation for Congress to consider at its next
session.82 The board’s 538-page report informed several key provisions
of the resulting Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907, which enumerated
a list of actions whose commission would result in the forfeiture of
one’s American citizenship.83 These included obtaining naturalization abroad, swearing an oath of allegiance to any foreign state, and residing for two years in one’s former country or ﬁve years in any other
country (presumably as a civilian). Unless the 1907 Act was intended
to supersede that of 1868 entirely, it is diﬃcult to avoid concluding that
the 1907 law was partially “inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government,” for it also stated that “no American citizen
shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.”84
81
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This was precisely the condition under which droves of Englishmen
sought naturalization in the United States in the early 1800s, after all,
and their predicaments had then elicited the support of America’s
greatest legal minds.
Chapter IV (“Loss of Nationality”) of the Nationality Act of 1940
contained a more thorough index of expatriable acts. New among
them were serving in a foreign state’s armed forces, voting in a foreign political election, formally renouncing one’s nationality before
an American consul stationed abroad, serving a foreign government in
any capacity, deserting the United States Army or Navy during a time
of war, and committing treason against the United States. Whereas
McCarran-Walter had denied foreign Communists entry into America,the Expatriation Act of 1954 contemplated the denaturalization and
expulsion of resident citizen-Communists insofar as the Communist
Party USA existed to “engag[e] in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down,
or to destroy by force the Government of the United States.”85
Though Congress inferred a power of expatriation from its express
and plenary power to regulate the naturalization process, its expatriation laws injure U.S. citizens possessing a vast complement of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has accordingly ruled that the use
of denationalization as a means of punishment is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ procedural guarantees to accused criminals.86 In Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), the Court held that “Congress has no
power under the Constitution to divest a person of his United States
citizenship absent his voluntary renunciation thereof.”87 An American’s participation in an Israeli election did not suﬃciently establish
an intent to relinquish his American citizenship, but his swearing allegiance to a foreign state certainly would have.

II: Exceptions to the Standard Naturalization Procedures
The idea of exceptional naturalization legislation seems oxymoronic.
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 merely empowers Congress to ﬁx a sin-
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gle standard to regularize aliens’ acquisition of American citizenship.
Congress is not expressly authorized to regulate naturalization as it
sees ﬁt, nor is it clearly granted the authority to eﬀectuate individual or
collective naturalizations itself, as it has often done with Native Americans and residents of American territories. Congress has nonetheless
exercised great latitude in the interpretation of its Naturalization
Clause powers, and it has occasionally waived the “uniform rule” for
select petitioners.

A. Derivative Citizenship
Although the Naturalization Act of 1790 spoke of “free white person[s],” from the beginning two groups included in a literal reading
of that phrase – women and children – were situated diﬀerently than
adult white males with respect to proper naturalization procedures.
For the most part, alien women and children acquired U.S. citizenship
exclusively through their husbands and fathers. The concept of derivative citizenship, as opposed to the obtainment of citizenship through
naturalization or birth within the United States, has historically been
one of two major types of exceptions to the regular naturalization procedures that aliens who seek U.S. citizenship are typically expected to
follow (the other type rewards aliens who have rendered honorable
service in the United States military with an expedited path to citizenship). What follows is a brief synopsis of Congressional legislation that
exempliﬁes this concept and helps demonstrate that women and men
have historically been aﬀected by naturalization laws in very diﬀerent
ways.
The 1790 Act itself contained a derivative element: The minor children (those under the age of twenty-one) of naturalized American citizens were to be considered citizens themselves as long as their fathers
had at some point resided in the United States. Citizenship could thus
be inherited only through the father. The Naturalization Act of 1802
conferred citizenship on the children of current or former citizens in
cases in which those children had been born outside the territorial limits of the United States. Yet this provision was purely retrospective; the
American lawyer Horace Binney noted in an 1853 pamphlet that
[i]t does not probably occur to the American families who
are visiting Europe … that all their children born in a foreign country are aliens, and when they return home will
54
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return under all the disabilities of aliens.88
An Act of February 10, 1855, which “passed presumably because of Mr.
Binney’s suggestion,” supplanted this inadvertent illogicality.89 The
Act declared that persons born outside of the United States, as long as
their fathers were or had been U.S. citizens, were to be considered citizens at birth. This law furnishes splendid evidence that a patriarchal
spirit animated early naturalization laws. It also helps to illustrate a
major historical trend in the conception and enactment of such legislation: More often than not, 19th- and 20th-century naturalization laws
not intended to serve as sweeping codiﬁcations arose to ﬁll voids in the
existing system or to ameliorate perceived injustices.
An unrelated section of the Act of 1855 provided that “any woman
who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws” who was
then married or became married to a U.S. citizen was to “be deemed
and taken to be a citizen.” Immigrant ﬁancées and spouses were obvious beneﬁciaries of this law, as were American bachelors with exotic tastes. But its language applied only to white women, coming as
it did ﬁfteen years before the Naturalization Act of 1870, and it designated a naturalized woman’s citizenship status as dependent on her
husband’s. Although the 1855 law contained the ﬁrst explicit acknowledgment that some women “might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws” – they, too, were “persons” – the citizenship of men and
women was hardly symmetric in one key respect, as citizenship could
be transmitted and derived only through husbands and fathers. The
Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907 gave notice that, henceforth, a woman who married a foreigner would take her husband’s nationality
and thus denaturalize herself.90 Furthermore, such a woman retained
the option of reacquiring American citizenship after the termination
of her marriage – a crude incentive to divorce one’s alien husband. A
woman’s marriage completely determined her citizenship status after
1907 – if she was an American and married another American, this status was undisturbed. If she was a white or black alien and married an
American, she took on her husband’s American citizenship. If she was
an American citizen and married a foreigner, she lost her U.S. citizenship.
88
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Congress dispensed entirely with the custom of derivative citizenship for brides with the Married Women’s Citizenship Act (or Cable
Act) of September 22, 1922.91 Petitioners to Congress in early 1916 argued that “such procedure is neither sane, safe nor expedient; especially now, when our Country is overshadowed by the great European
War.”92 After the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratiﬁcation in 1920, marital derivative citizenship also enfranchised women who had lived their
entire lives in allegiance to foreign sovereigns. The National Woman’s
Party and other feminist organizations determined to exercise their
newly won political power justly claimed credit for the Cable Act’s successful passage, however.93 After 1922, no alien woman who married a
U.S. citizen or whose husband was duly naturalized became a citizen
by reason of her husband’s citizenship, nor did any woman citizen lose
her American citizenship because of her marriage to an alien (with one
critical kind of exception). Instead, such a married woman could only
obtain naturalization “upon full and complete compliance with all requirements of the naturalization laws,” though no prior declaration of
intention and a much shorter residence period would now be required
of her. The Cable Act ﬁrmly “established the principle that marriage
and citizenship could be separate and unique civic identities.”94
The Cable Act may have discontinued derivative citizenship for women, but it did not end gender discrimination in naturalization laws. It
also contained a gratuitous manifesto of Congress’s racial prejudices.
Section 3 of the Act declared that “any woman [but not a male] citizen
who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen
of the United States.” After 1922, then, “marriage to a non-white [and
non-black] alien by an American woman was akin to treason against
this country: either of these acts justiﬁed the stripping of citizenship
from someone American by birth.”95
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Section 3’s denaturalization provision was rescinded just nine
years later in an Act of March 3, 1931, which declared that
[a] woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be
a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage [to
an alien ineligible for naturalization] … unless she makes
a formal renunciation of her citizenship.96
Its work hardly complete, the National Woman’s Party pressured the
Roosevelt administration to sign the Montevideo Convention on the
Nationality of Women at the Seventh International Conference of
American States, which was held from December 3-26, 1933.97 All of
the Convention’s High Contracting Parties agreed that “[t]here shall
be no distinction based on sex as regards nationality, in their legislation or in their practice.”98 A Congressional Act of May 24, 1934 reafﬁrmed that a child born outside of the United States to at least one
American citizen was a citizen at birth, but citizenship would now descend to the child if either parent had previously lived in the United
States.99 That only a mother’s residence would suﬃce for a foreignborn child’s acquisition of American citizenship was a dramatic reversal from an unbroken line of legislation to the contrary, one dating all
the way back to the seminal Act of 1790.

B. Expedited Naturalization for Alien Veterans
The second major historical exception to the usual naturalization procedures pertains to immigrants serving in the United States military.
This exception, in turn, may be divided into two subcategories: laws
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that have allowed aliens already eligible for naturalization to expedite
their applications for citizenship and ones that have enabled alien veterans of racial groups otherwise ineligible for naturalization to petition for American citizenship despite the standing restrictions of applicable naturalization laws. The existence of such exemptions for immigrant-soldiers has functioned to swell the ranks of America’s armed
forces during wartime and to reward aliens able and willing to risk their
lives in defense of American institutions with the recognition that they
have amply demonstrated their ﬁtness for what many among them regard as the highest earthly desideratum.
On July 17, 1862, Congress granted the ﬁrst dispensation of this sort
to alien veterans of the armies of the United States.100 That law enabled
such veterans to become citizens without ﬁling a declaration of intention and upon only one year’s residence in the United States, though
it required proof of honorable discharge and of good moral character,
as became the norm in such legislation. An Act of July 26, 1894 allowed
ﬁve-year veterans of the U.S. Navy or individuals who had served one
full term in the Marine Corps to be admitted as citizens with no previous declaration of intention.101 Six months after America’s entry into
World War I in April of 1917, Congress declared that any American who
had expatriated himself since August 1, 1914 by swearing an oath of allegiance to and taking up arms for a country allied with the United States
in the present hostilities could “reassume and acquire” the trappings
of American citizenship merely by swearing an oath of allegiance to
this nation.102 The law constituted an oﬃcial recognition that the expatriates’ actions had not been dishonorable or treasonous but were
rather patriotic (if initially suspect) sacriﬁces warranting the highest
national encomiums. A virtually identical law was enacted on April 2,
1942 to cover U.S. citizens who took up arms for England and other of
America’s eventual allies in World War II after September 1, 1939.103
Laws excepting veterans from certain prerequisites to naturalization are typically applicable only for a designated period of time (usually two to ﬁve years), and so such legislation has accompanied nearly
every major conﬂict in which the United States has participated since
the Civil War. The circumstances surrounding the drafting and pas100
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sage of the Act of May 9, 1918 yield a great deal of insight into Congress’s propensity to treat alien soldiers favorably.104 That law waived
the ﬁve-year residence requirement for three-year veterans of the
armed forces, and it provided that aliens who served the United States
during World War I (with no distinctions among whites, blacks, Asians,
Native Americans, or any other ethnic group) did not need to ﬁle a declaration of intention in order to become citizens.
The Selective Service Act of May 18,1917 had mandated that all men
– citizens and noncitizens alike – register with the Selective Service System.105 Sixteen percent of the approximately 24,000,000 men who registered were aliens, and other nations (especially ones with which the
United States was then at war) formally protested against the conscription of their nationals.106 The May 9, 1918 Act thus envisioned the disappearance of the underlying premise of such diplomatic diﬃculties;
it may also have been intended to secure the loyalty of various ethnic
communities in the post-war period by encouraging individual members to view their national civic identity as transcending all parochial
ones. It most certainly aimed to increase the cohort of able-bodied
American warriors and reward honorably discharged alien veterans
for their exemplary service. The fact that even Chinese nationals who
had served in the U.S. military during World War I could now theoretically become naturalized (the law spoke of “any person”) shows that
“racialist deﬁnitions of citizenship remained contested and could be
dislodged when other ideals of citizenship – in particular, the warrior
ideal – better served strategic and ideological needs.”107
But many federal judges refused to construe a longstanding policy
out of existence through the unscientiﬁc detection of Congressional
implication and intendment. As a result, whether an Asian-American
veteran could become naturalized depended entirely upon the disposition of the judge to whom he petitioned, and many of these applications were not even entertained.108 Nearly two decades later, in considering legislation that would make explicit the apparent racial exemption of May 9, 1918, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization regarded the bill as “simply a measure of justice” for those
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“who are today very largely products of the environments of the United States, and qualiﬁed to serve this country acceptably in peace, as
citizens, as they did in war, as aliens.”109 The Nye-Lea Act of June 24,
1935, which passed after years of intense lobbying from the American
Legion and other veteran groups, decreed that notwithstanding previous naturalization laws’ racial limitations, “any alien veteran of the

Figure 5: An original printed copy of what soon became the NyeLea Act of 1935. National Archives, Center for Legislative
Archives. (Author’s photo)
World War heretofore ineligible to citizenship because not a free white
person or of African nativity” could seek naturalization without ﬁling
a declaration of intention and with no additional residence require-
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ment.110 Nye-Lea, then, was the veterans’ McCarran-Walter, which it
preceded by seventeen years.
Acts of March 27, 1942 (often referred to as the Second War Powers Act), June 30, 1953, and October 24, 1968 dispensed with many basic procedural requirements and allowed alien veterans who served in
the armed forces of the United States during World War II, the Korean
War, and the Vietnam War, respectively, to become U.S. citizens forthwith if they so desired.111 An Act of June 28, 1968 provided for the summary naturalization of surviving spouses of U.S. citizens who died in
active military service.112 This law is particularly curious in that it contemplates the derivative acquisition of American citizenship only after
the citizen-soldier’s death in the line of duty. A relevant analogy would
be a woman immigrant’s obtainment of citizenship through marriage
after (but not before) her husband’s passing in the pre-Cable regime.
On November 22, 1994, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order
12939, which exempted aliens who served in the U.S. military during
the Persian Gulf War from the residential requirement for naturalization. In this instance, President Clinton acted pursuant to a Congressional delegation of its authority to “designate … a period in which
Armed Forces of the United States are or were engaged in military operations involving armed conﬂict with a hostile foreign force” for purposes of expediting veterans’ naturalizations.113 President George W.
Bush classiﬁed the period following September 11, 2001 as such a conﬂict in Executive Order 13269 (signed on July 3, 2002).

Conclusion
I hope that my joint analysis of procedure, eligibility, expatriation, and
exceptions has produced a rich mosaic of the conditions Congress has
historically imposed upon the most desirable civic inducement America can oﬀer to aliens foreign and domestic. The logistical diﬃculty of
acquiring American citizenship, the classiﬁcation of petitioners as eligible or ineligible for that merit, the kinds of acts Congress has deemed
worthy of denaturalization, and the allowance of exemptions from
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Congress’s “uniform rule” all oﬀer clues to Congress’s historical valuation of a prize whose acquisition it alone may regulate.
From the vantage of today, the unsavory features of superseded
naturalization laws rightly continue to linger as stains on America’s
historical reputation. Their text once ordained what Franklin Roosevelt condemned as “injustice[s]” and “mistakes of the past.” But as
Congress broadened the pool of eligible petitioners – indeed, at the
very moment racial characteristics became immaterial in the naturalization process – it simultaneously demanded more of candidates’
hearts and intellects than ever before. The Founders granted themselves the naturalization power and devised procedures that stymied
the growth of opposing political factions or reinforced the predominance of their own. Immigration and naturalization remain hotly contested political topics, of course, but subsequent generations of statesmen have reclaimed Congress’s naturalization power as an eﬀective
tool in their enduring quest to cultivate a model citizenry.
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